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Malicious Code Detection Model Based on Behavior Association
Lansheng Han, Mengxiao Qian , Xingbo Xu, Cai Fu, and Hamza Kwisaba
Abstract: Malicious applications can be introduced to attack users and services so as to gain financial rewards,
individuals’ sensitive information, company and government intellectual property, and to gain remote control of
systems. However, traditional methods of malicious code detection, such as signature detection, behavior detection,
virtual machine detection, and heuristic detection, have various weaknesses which make them unreliable. This
paper presents the existing technologies of malicious code detection and a malicious code detection model is
proposed based on behavior association. The behavior points of malicious code are first extracted through API
monitoring technology and integrated into the behavior; then a relation between behaviors is established according
to data dependence. Next, a behavior association model is built up and a discrimination method is put forth using
pushdown automation. Finally, the exact malicious code is taken as a sample to carry out an experiment on the
behavior’s capture, association, and discrimination, thus proving that the theoretical model is viable.
Key words: malicious code; behavior monitor; behavior association; pushdown automation
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Introduction

With the rapid development of computer technology,
the computer has penetrated every aspect of people’s
lives but, while the openness and flexibility of
computers bring convenience, with this come various
security risks. Malware such as viruses, trojans,
and botnets has caused great financial loss to many
individuals, companies, and governments and becomes
one of the major factors that threaten internet
security. As the security threat becomes more and more
serious, a deeper understanding of trojans[1] , viruses[2] ,
and botnets[3] has been required and some advances
have been made.
Popular malicious code detection methods including
signature detection, behavior detection, virtual
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machine detection, heuristic detection, etc., have
their drawbacks. Signature detection can only identify
known malicious code; it does not work on unknown
malicious code[4, 5] . Behavior detection depends too
much on program execution so its discrimination
may be wrong if the execution conditions are not
met[6, 7] . Virtual machine detection can generally
detect encrypted malicious code but it needs the
help of signature scanning and, furthermore, code
with special instructions may escape virtual machine
detection[8] . Heuristic detection can discriminate
unknown malicious code, but it has complicated
judgment logic, difficult development, and a high false
positive ratio[9, 10] .
Analyzing the various malicious code detection
technologies and assessing their respective pros and
cons, we find that all the above detection technologies
have one thing in common: they are all focused on
the local characteristics of malicious code. Needless to
say, local characteristics are not unique to malicious
code. In addition as hackers improve their malware
writing skills, the characteristics of malicious code
gradually change, making antivirus software which
focuses on local characteristics have a higher false
positive ratio. This has therefore made it necessary to
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detect malicious code’s whole behavior.
Accordingly, we put forward a detection method
based on behavior association. In this method, we
focus on the abstract description of malicious behavior
with the intent to clarify the relationship between
behaviors rather than considering the maliciousness
of a single behavior. The purpose is to analyze the
malicious code comprehensively and to increase the rate
of discrimination of malicious code.
In summary we make the following contributions:
 For the first time we propose a new method for
malware detection using behavior association.
 We provide a practical implementation of our
newly proposed model and through the experiments
performed, it proves to be reliable.
 We also study and show the weaknesses of currently
used malware detection technologies.

2

Behavior Association Model

2.1
2.1.1

The definition of behavior association
Behavior point

Definition 1 A behavior point is an API that the
program calls in order to finish a function.
From classifying Windows API, we get 5 categories:
file behavior point, registry behavior point, process
behavior point, web behavior point, and other behavior
point.
2.1.2

Behavior

Definition 2 Behavior is a set of one or multiple
relatively close behavior points, such as reading file
behavior fOpenFile, ReadFileg or ending process
behavior fOpenProcess, TerminateProcessg. To facilitate the description of the subsequent algorithm, the
formal description is as follows:
The behavior is described by 5-tuples A=(S,I,O,T,C),
where S represents the behavior states (execution
results), such as success, failure or other states; I
represents the input of the behavior; O represents
the output of the behavior; T represents the type of
behavior, such as file behavior, process behavior; C
represents the set of behavior points that combine the
behavior.
2.1.3

behavior B represents writing file, the content written
in file(B) is from reading file(A); specifically, the input
of behavior B comes from the output of behavior
A(A.O!B.I), which means that behavior B depends on
behavior A, written as A!B.
2.2

The digraph of behavior association

Since the relationship between behaviors is a dependence relationship, digraph G(V,E) can be used to
represent behavior association. A node Vi represents
a behavior, a directed edge (Vi ,Vj ) represents the
dependence relationship, while Vi !Vj represents Vj
which depends on Vi .
Here, we take an example trojan to establish a
behavior association digraph.
The trojan’s main functions are as follows: (1) open
some ports of the computer; (2) communicate with the
remote host; (3) steal important information (username,
password, etc.) from the target computer; (4) monitor
the desktop of the target computer; (5) run on start up.
The trojan’s execution process is as follows: add
starting up work itemH)open a portH)communicate
with remote hostH)monitor the desktop of target
computerH)steal important information from target
computerH)start a new processH)end process.
First, we extract the following behaviors from the
behavior points: 1 work after starting up; 2 open
a port; 3 receive connection from remote host;
4 receive information from remote host; 5 send
information to remote host; 6 start process; 7 end
process; 8 read file; 9 screen-shot.
Then, we establish behavior association. It is
obvious that 1 , 2 , 8 , and 9 do not depend on
other behaviors, and that the remaining behaviors’
dependence relationships are as follows: f 2 ! 3 ,
3!4, 3!5, 4!5, 5!4, 8!5, 9!5,
4 ! 6 , 4 ! 7 g. The behavior association digraph is
shown in Fig. 1.

Behavior association

Definition 3
Behavior association is the relationship between behaviors, mainly referring to dependence
relationships.
For example, behavior A represents reading file,
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Fig. 1

Behavior association digraph.
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From Fig. 1, we can clearly see the trojan’s
behavior association so its identification is not difficult,
but establishing the behavior associations is the key
problem that we must solve.
2.3
2.3.1

Behavior association establishment
Behavior extraction

Behavior extraction is the integration of monitored
behavior points into a behavior.
To do this, we first put the behavior points into
the corresponding category, then deal with integration
within the category. Behavior point integration relies
on the kernel object[11] . When a function that creates
the kernel object is called, a handle representing the
object is returned by the function so, if we want to
manipulate the kernel object, we need to send the
handle to the API function so that the behavior can be
extracted through the handle. Handles can be divided
into five categories according to the behavior point’s
classification; for each category, a linked list is used
to save handles. When a new handle is created, it is
taken to the corresponding linked list. If we need to
analyze the behavior point that manipulates the handle,
we request it from the corresponding linked list, then
integrate the behavior points which have called the same
handle into a behavior, and thus the process of behavior
extraction is finished.
2.3.2

The establishment of relationship between
behaviors

After behavior extraction, we then establish the
relationship between behaviors.
The relationship between behaviors includes data
and non-data dependence; in this paper we focus
on the former. Data dependence means the ordinal
relations in data processing, such as transitive
relations. For example, when document B reads
document A’s content, it is a typical data transitive
relation. This relationship is relatively close so the
behavior association could be established by data
dependence. Non-data dependence mainly refers to the
dependence of logical structure: for example, behavior
A and behavior B access or modify different fields in the
same database file. In comparison to data dependence,
non-data dependence has a looser relationship and
behavior association can not therefore be established.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the
relationship between behaviors can be obtained by
tracking the programs that the data file accesses. For

example, we can record the behavior’s data address
(internal memory or buffer) and its change, and
observe whether the data address is called by other
behaviors. With this, we can determine the dependence
between behaviors from the data’s transmission and
establish a behavior association digraph based on
Section 2.2.
The record of behavior buffer is shown in Fig. 2 and
detailed algorithm is as follows:
For each collected behaviorAi do:
Record related buffer Bi;k from k D 1 to k D m under Ai
For new collected behavior Aj
For all collected behavior Ai do:
For all related buffer Bi;k
From k D 1 to k D m do:
Compare (Bj;1 , Bi;k )
Next
Next
If Bi;k equals Bj;1
Then Ai ! Aj
Else
Record related buffer Bj;k under Aj

The relationship between behaviors is mostly
transmitted by parameters while a minority is
transmitted by commands without parameters, such
as the shutdown command. In most cases, behavior
B can call a related parameter of behavior A, thus
manipulating the data which behavior A manipulated,
further establishing the data relationship between
the two behaviors. In other words, the analysis of
parameters can help us understand more about the
relationship between behaviors. Take the address
parameter for example: A buffer is a kind of typical
address parameter. When we analyze the buffer address,
we can regard address av and the address space sv to
which ˛v points as the same parameter, so that address
a .av 6 a 6 sv ) is a parameter. To analyze the address
parameter better, we can classify some addresses
with important attributes such as import table, service
description table, entry point, etc. A decision tree can
be established based on address space, as shown in

Fig. 2

Record of behavior buffer.
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Fig. 3, so we can analyze different address spaces better
with the help of a decision tree[12] .

(5)<DirectCopy>::=send object1!object2.

3

(1) <Propagate>::=<Open><Read><Transmit>
j<Read><Open><Transmit>
(2)<Transmit>::=<Format><Write>j<Write>.

The Grammar Description and
Discrimination of Behavior Association

Once the behavior association digraph is established,
we can describe the behavior association using the
behavior’s grammar, so that detecting malicious
behavior can become a question of analyzing this
grammar which can be done by automation.
3.1

The grammar description of malicious
behavior

We take a typical trojan as an example to show the
malicious behavior’s grammar description. According
to the analysis of the trojan’s main behaviors in Section
2.2 and with the help of grammatical analysis[13] , we
give the following grammar description.
3.1.1

Grammar of duplication behavior

Duplication behavior can be divided into three types:
mono-block read/write, intersecting read/write, and
direct-copy.
(1)<Duplicate>::=<Create><Open><Read><Write>
// “::=” means “define”
j<Open><Create><Read><Write>
// “j” means “or”
j<Open><Read><Create><Write>
// “<>” represents a grammatical unit
j<Open><Create><IntrlvRW>
j<Create><Open><IntrlvRW>
j<DirectCopy>;
(2) <Read>::=receive object1 object2;
(3) <Write>::=send object1!object2;
(4) <IntrlvRW>::=while(receive object1 object2)f
send object3!object4;g

3.1.2

3.1.3

Transitive behavior grammar

Infection behavior grammar

(1) <Infection>::=<Search><Open><Relocate><Read>
<Mutation><Write>
j<Search><Open><Read><Relocate>
<Mutation><Write>
(2) <Search> ::= while(find object)f
open object1 ;
receive object2 object1;g
(3) <Relocate> ::= receive object2 object1;
send object2!object1;
j null.
3.2

Pushdown automation

After finishing the grammar description of behavior
association, we can establish a state transition diagram
with states, behavior, and grammar description as
input. This can be done by automation.
In comparison to finite automation, pushdown
automation has a stack architecture which can be used
to record the function call and the data returned. This
makes it more precise than finite automation and is why
we choose pushdown automation to establish the model.
In PushDown Automation (PDA)[14, 15] M can be
describe by a 7-tuples:
M=(Q, ˙, , ı, q0 , Z0 , F);
where Q is a finite set of states. 8q 2 Q is a state
in Q, means behavior association states; ˙ is the
input alphabet, means a set of malicious behaviors and
behavior grammar;
is the stack alphabet, 8T 2 ,
T is a stack symbol; Z0 2
is a start symbol; q0 2
Q is the initial state of M, means the initial behavior
state; F 2 Q is a set of final states, means the final state
the pushdown automation can reach, which means the
behavior detected is malicious; ı is a transition function.

ı: Q  .˙ [ f"g/ ! 2QT I
8.q; a; Z/ 2 Q  ˙ 

Fig. 3

Address analysis.

;

ı.q; a; Z/ D f.p1 ; r1 /; .p2 ; r2 /;    ; .pm ; rm /g means
that the PDA is in state q, with input symbol a and the
top symbol Z on the stack alphabet. For any i, entering
state pi , replaces symbol Z by string ri from right to
left, and advances the input head one symbol.
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3.3

The process of discrimination

We can configure a series of pushdown automation
based on numerous samples of malicious code. If there
are behaviors which need to be detected, we can use
pushdown automation to discriminate them with the
behaviors as input. If the final state can be reached
by pushdown automation it means the behavior is
malicious. The automation model is as shown in Fig. 4.
The detailed algorithm is as follows:
Behavior Detection .A1 ;    ; An /
where Ai are collected behaviors (input symbol combined
with semantic values: f˙ [ "g)
For each collected behavior Ai do:
For all the automation Mk
from k D 1 to k 6 n do:
For all state and stack .Qk;j ; k;j /
from j D 1 to j 6 m do:
Mk .ll-parse .Ai ; .Qk;j ; k;j //
Next
Next
Next
M .ll-pares(A; .Q; ))
If A; Q; match a transition
T 2 ıM Then
If Q is an accepting state Q 2 FM
Then malicious behavior detected
Else
Change the current state
Else
Ignore A

4

Experiment

The subject experiment is done on a virtual machine
running Windows XP SP3 with Microsoft Visual C++
6.0 as the development tool.
The experiment detects the same virus sample using
both popular commercial antivirus solutions and the

Fig. 4

The model of pushdown automation.

behavior association model proposed in the paper. We
then compare and analyze the results from which we
find the model to be viable. The sample used in the lab
for the experiment contains a keyboard hook module,
a virus self-replicating module, a repeated infection
prevention module, and a self-hiding module.
Experiment procedure is as follows:
(1) Monitor API by API monitoring module;
(2) Extract behavior according to API monitored;
(3) Establish behavior association digraph, as shown
in Table 1.
Table 1 shows us the capture of behavior and
the establishment of relationship. It can be seen that
behavior points of malicious code are not obviously
different from those of a normal application, but the
malicious element gradually manifests itself. The key
technology of integrating behavior points into behavior
is in the fourth column of the table that is obtaining
the association of behavior points by parameters. If
the dependence relationship cannot be obtained, the
subsequent discrimination will be difficult.
(4) Establish pushdown automation according to the
virus’ behavior association, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 shows the discrimination of associated
behavior by pushdown automation. From the table,
we can see that it is possible to carry out malicious
discrimination by pushdown automation, but the
premise is that we collect numerous and typical samples
of malicious code.
(5) Discriminate behavior using pushdown automation and other antivirus software as shown in Table 3.
To determine the viability of the behavior association
discrimination technique, we choose 15 malicious
codes, four of which have been very well known
during the last few years: ZeuS (record bank
details of customers by keystroke logging and
form grabbing), Reveton (extort money by locking
user’s computer), Red October (attack computers of
diplomatic institutions) and Trojan.Generic (steal the
password). The remaining 11 malicious codes are
undisclosed among which the first eight are trojans
whose aim is to steal the target’s information, such
as collecting the IP address, hooking the keyboard,
etc. The last three are worms which replicate themselves
in order to spread to other computers, as well as collect
the target’s routing information.
From Table 3 we can see that the popular commercial
antivirus solutions can only give inconclusive warnings
about the undisclosed malicious code. On the contrary,
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Table 1

Behavior and dependence relationship.

Behavior point
GetCurrentDirectoryA

Behaviors extraction
V1: Get the directory

CreateFileA

V2: Open the target file

CreateFileMappingA
MapViewOfFile
SetFilePointer
WriteFile
SetEndOfFile
FlushViewOfFile
UnmapViewOfFile
CloseHandle
GetCurrentDirectoryA
CopyFileA
CreateProcessA
GetModuleFileNameA
CloseHandle
ExitProcess

V4: Require file pointer
V5: Write file

V7: Require system directory
V8: Copy file to system directory
V9: Create process

V4!V5
V5!V6

Transmitted by file buffer
Transmitted by file handle 00000010

V7!V8

Transmitted by directory buffer 0013FC28

V9!V10

Transmitted by process handle

V11!V10

Transmitted by process handle

V10: Program self-detects
V11: Quit program

Stack
alphabet

Q0: starting program
state

V1,V2

Z0

Q1:opening file state

V4,V5,V6

Q2:writing file state

V5,V6

Q3:closing file state
Q4:copying file state

V7,V8
V9

Q5:creating process state V10,V11

Description of pushdown automation.
Transitive function

Explanation

ı(Q0,fV1,V2g,Z1)=f(Q1,Z1)g Reaching opening file state by opening file

ı(Q1,fV4,V5g,Z1)=f(Q2,Z2)g Reaching writing file state by writing data into file
Reaching closing file state by closing file directly
ı(Q1,fV6g,Z1)=f(Q3,Z5)g
after opening the file
Staying in writing file states by inputting writing file
Z2, Z3 ı(Q2,fV5g,Z2)=f(Q2,Z3)g
behavior
Z4, Z5 ı(Q3,fV7,V8g,Z4)=f(Q4,Z6)g Copying by duplication grammar
Z6
ı(Q4,fV9g,Z6)=f(Q5,Z7)g
Reaching creating process state by creating process
ı(Q5,fV10g,Z7)=f(Q5,Z8)g
Staying in creating state if the program self-detects
Z7, Z8
ı(Q5,fV11g,Z7)=f(Q6,Z9)g
Reaching the final state by quitting program
Z9
Z1

however, the method we propose can conclusively
identify malicious code and this proves the method’s
viability. The disadvantage of our method is that the
capture and analysis take too much time. However,
we believe that the time cost will decrease with the
development of theory and technology.

5

Related parameter explanation
Transmitted by buffer 0x0013FE30
Transmitted by file handle 00000010
Transmitted by file handle 00000010
Transmitted by file handle 00000010

V6: Close file

Input
alphabet

Q6:ending program state

Behavior association
V1!V2
V2!V3
V2!V4
V2!V6

V3: Map file

Table 2
State alphabet
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Conclusions

Looking at the current detection of malicious code
technologies being used, we point out that the problem
of discrimination of malicious code, which is the
premise of identification, is not solved. Malicious
code today is different from that of the past,
which had obvious characteristics. Current antivirus

solutions work by downloading suspicious behavior
from everyday computer users from which they
extract the signatures which are used to catch the
malware. Malicious code nowadays has a stronger
sense of purpose and pertinence; it therefore will not
randomly infect an everyday users’ computer, which
makes the discrimination process difficult.
For this reason, we propose a malicious code
detection method based on behavior association. First,
the definitions of behavior points and behavior are
given, and then malicious behavior is described
by 5-tuples, after which classification of the
relationship between behaviors is done. The behavior
association is shown by a relationship digraph while
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Table 3 Comparison of behavior association method with
existing antivirus methods.

[4]
Malicious code

Qihoo
360

King
soft

Kasper
sky

?
!
?
?
!
!
!
!
!
?
!
p
p
p
p

?
?
?
?
!
!
p

?
?
!
!
!
!
p

!
p

!
!
?
!
p
p
p
p

Key.Trojan.a
Vidio.Trojan.win
Pswd.Trojan.t
Getkbd.Trojan.W
Cross.Trojan.net
Pswget.Trojan.b
IPget.Trojan.win
Fish.Trojan.net
Crem.Worm.b
Netloc.Worm.hns
Joke.Worm.wh
ZeuS
Reveton
Red October
Trojan.Generic

?
?
p
p
p
p

Behavior
association
method
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
!
p

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]
[9]

!

p

Notes: Symbols “?”, “!”, and “ ” denote “unknown”,
“warning”, and “identified”, respectively.

a detailed method of catching the relationship is also
provided. Next, the malicious behavior association is
described by the behavior’s grammar and a discriminate
model based on pushdown automation is proposed,
according to the behavior association and grammar
description. Finally, typical malicious code is used to
carry out the experiment, with the experimental results
demonstrating that the model is a viable solution.
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